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Abstract
Following an early work of Dwork and Stockmeyer on interactive proof systems whose verifiers are
two-way probabilistic finite automata, the authors initiated in 2004 a study on the computational
power of quantum interactive proof systems whose verifiers are particularly limited to quantum
finite automata. As a follow-up to the authors’ early journal publication [J. Comput. System
Sci., vol.75, pp.255–269, 2009], we further investigate the quantum nature of interactions between
provers and verifiers by studying how various restrictions on quantum interactive proof systems
affect the language recognition power of the proof systems. In particular, we examine three
intriguing restrictions that (i) provers always behave in a classical fashion, (ii) verifiers always
reveal to provers the information on next moves, and (iii) the number of interactions between
provers and verifiers is bounded.
Keywords: finite automaton, interactive proof system, quantum computing, classical prover, quan-
tum prover, interaction
1 Overview
Quantum mechanics has provided an unconventional means to fast computing and secure communication
since early 1980s. The potential power of quantum interactions between two parties—a prover and a verifier—
motivated the authors [15] in 2004 to investigate a quantum analogy of an early work of Dwork and Stock-
meyer [6] on classical interactive proof (IP) systems whose verifiers are restricted to two-way probabilistic
finite automata (or 2pfa’s, in short). Such weak verifiers can represent computations that utilize only a finite
amount of memory space. These IP systems are a special case of a much wider scope of space-bounded
IP systems of Condon [4]. It has been shown that those IP systems behave quite differently from time-
bounded IP systems. Although verifier’s power is limited to 2pfa’s, as Dwork and Stockmeyer dexterously
demonstrated, 2pfa-verifier IP systems turn out to be significantly powerful, because a number of inter-
actions with a mighty prover can enhance the 2pfa-verifier’s ability to recognize much more complicated
languages than the 2pfa’s alone recognize. To describe succinctly such restricted IP systems, Dwork and
Stockmeyer introduced a special notation IP(〈restriction〉) for a class of languages that are recognized by
bounded-error IP systems with weak verifiers under restrictions specified by 〈restriction〉. For instance,
the notation IP(2pfa, poly-time) expresses the language class characterized by IP systems with 2pfa verifiers
operated in expected polynomial time. The seminal work of Dwork and Stockmeyer further studied numerous
subjects (private coins versus public coins, etc.) for a basis model of 2pfa-verifier IP systems. To express
Babai’s Arthur-Merlin proof systems [3], in particular, they introduced another notation AM(〈restriction〉)
under restrictions given in 〈restrictions〉. An immediate advantage of studying such weak verifier models
is to prove certain types of separations and collapses among the associated complexity classes without any
unproven assumption. For instance, Dwork and Stockmeyer successfully separated IP(2pfa, poly-time) from
AM(2pfa), and AM(2pfa, poly-time) from AM(2pfa). Another significant advantage is that their restricted
models make it easier to analyze the behaviors of two parties—a prover and a verifier—during a usually
complicated communication process between them.
Unlike Watrous’ model [17] of circuit-based quantum interactive proof (QIP) systems, a basic QIP model
of the authors [15, 16] uses a measure-many two-way quantum finite automaton (or 2qfa) of Kondacs and
Watrous [11] as a weak verifier who can communicate with a mighty quantum prover through a quantum
communication bulletin board (implemented as a communication cell that holds at each moment one symbol
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Conference on Implementation and Application of Automata (CIAA 2004), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.3317,
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from a communication alphabet). They also considered two additional variants of verifiers: a measure-
once one-way quantum finite automaton (or mo-1qfa) of Moore and Crutchfield [13] and a measure-many
one-way quantum finite automaton (or 1qfa) of Kondacs and Watrous [11]. An initial study of QIP sys-
tems with those weak verifiers reveals their noticeable strength. Let us recall from [16] a general notation
QIP(〈restrictions〉) for bounded-error QIP systems under restrictions indicated by 〈restrictions〉, analogous
to the aforementioned notation IP(〈restriction〉) of Dwork and Stockmeyer. For instance, QIP(2qfa) is ob-
tained by restricting all verifiers to 2qfa’s. Likewise, a use of mo-1qfa verifiers and 1qfa verifiers introduces
the language classes QIP(mo-1qfa) and QIP(1qfa), respectively.
The power of quantum interaction was exemplified in [16]. (i) With mo-1qfa verifiers, it holds that
MO-1QFA $ QIP(mo-1qfa) $ REG, where REG is the class of regular languages and MO-1QFA is the
class of all languages recognized by bounded-error mo-1qfa’s. (ii) With 1qfa verifiers, we obtain 1QFA $
QIP(1qfa) = REG, where 1QFA is the class of all languages recognized by bounded-error 1qfa’s. (iii)
With 2qfa verifiers, it holds that QIP(1qfa) $ QIP(2qfa, poly-time) * AM(2pfa). In addition, they
showed that 2QFAA ⊆ P and QIPC˜(2qfa, poly-time) ⊆ NP, where A and C˜ respectively indicate that all
(transition) amplitudes of qfa verifiers are algebraic complex numbers and polynomial-time “approximable”
complex numbers. The last result clearly contrasts with the following classical containments: AM(2pfa) ⊆
IP(2pfa, poly-time) ⊆ PSPACE [6].
We intend to continue a study of qfa-verifier QIP systems from various aspects of computational com-
plexity. In particular, This paper aims at presenting three intriguing subjects that were briefly discussed in
[15] but have been excluded from the authors’ early journal publication [16]. In this current publication, we
shall examine strengths and weaknesses of qfa-verifier QIP systems by observing how various restrictions on
the QIP systems affect their power of language recognition. Our investigation is focused on the following
three selected subjects.
1. Classical provers versus quantum provers. In the model of QIP systems in [16], provers are
basically quantum machines, which can apply any predetermined unitary operators. In contrast, provers in
IP systems of Dwork and Stockmeyer [6] are essentially “probabilistic” machines, which can flip privately
owned coins and decide what messages to send back to 2pfa verifiers. These probabilistic machines, however,
are known to be reduced to deterministic machines, which are naturally associated with unitary operators
whose entries are only 0s and 1s because the provers can use an unlimited amount of private memory
storage. For convenience, we briefly call such provers classical provers; in contrast, we call standard provers
quantum provers. Naturally, we raise a simple question of whether our quantum provers are truly different
in recognition power from the aforementioned classical provers.
It appears that a classical prover helps a 2qfa verifier much more than a quantum prover does. For
instance, the language Center = {x1y | x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗, |x| = |y|} is not yet known to belong to QIP(2qfa);
however, interactions with a classical prover allow a 2qfa verifier to recognize this particular language. Such a
strength of using classical provers stems from a simple fact that an analysis of classical-prover QIP protocols
is much easier than that of quantum-prover ones. This paper further shows the following containments
and separations concerning classical provers, where we use the restriction 〈c-prover〉 to indicate the use
of classical provers. (i) QIP(1qfa) ⊆ QIP(1qfa, c-prover). (ii) AM(2pfa) $ QIP(2qfa, c-prover). (iii)
AM(2pfa, poly-time) $ QIP(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover) * AM(2pfa). A core argument used for these results
is a technical construction of appropriate QIP protocols that recognize target languages. All the above results
will be presented in Section 3.
2. Public information versus private information. As noted earlier, Dwork and Stockmeyer [6]
examined two different types of IP systems—IP(〈restriction〉) and AM(〈restriction〉)—when verifiers are
limited to 2pfa’s. The latter IP system AM(〈restriction〉) refers to Babai’s model of Arthur-Merlin proof
systems [3] (also known as “public-coin” IP systems), in which verifiers flip fair coins to decide next moves
and reveal their outcomes, essentially showing a state of next internal configurations to mighty provers, who
can keep track of the verifier’s past configurations. In comparison, standard IP systems are often referred
to as “private-coin” IP systems. A question concerning “public coins” versus “private coins,” which was a
key subject in [6], is essentially whether the prover obtains “complete information” or “partial information”
on the configurations of the verifier. It was shown in [6] that 2PFA 6= AM(2pfa) 6= IP(2pfa), highlighting
a clear difference between public information and private information.
Likewise, we shall introduce a similar “publicness” notion to qfa-verifier QIP systems by demanding
verifiers to reveal their next moves to provers at every step. To express the public-coin analogue of QIP
systems, we use the notation 〈public〉 as a restriction to such systems.§ With this notation, for instance,
QIP(1qfa, public) denotes the language class obtained from QIP(1qfa) by restricting verifiers to publicly
§These new QIP systems might be possibly expressed as QAM(〈restriction〉) analogous to AM(〈restriction〉).
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announcing their next moves. It turns out that public QIP systems remain significantly powerful. To
be more precise, we shall prove the following three class relations. (i) 1RFA $ QIP(1qfa, public) *
1QFA, (ii) QIP(2qfa, public, poly-time) * AM(2pfa, poly-time), and (iii) QIP(2qfa, public, c-prover) *
AM(2pfa, poly-time), where 1RFA is the language family induced by one-way (deterministic) reversible
finite automata (1rfa’s, in short) [1]. In Section 4, we shall discuss those results in details.
3. The number of interactions between a prover and a verifier. As suggested in [16, Section
6], the number of interactions between a prover and a verifier in a weak-verifier QIP system may serve
as a complexity measure of classifying various languages. Unlike Dwork-Stockmeyer IP systems, the orig-
inal QIP systems of the authors [16] were introduced as to force two parties—a prover and a verifier—to
communicate with each other at every step and, through Sections 3–4, we shall take this definition of QIP
systems. To study the precise effect of interactions, nevertheless, we need to modify this original model
slightly so that the verifier can interact with the prover only when he needs any help from the prover.
To express those new QIP systems and their corresponding language classes, we invent two new notations
QIP#(〈restrictions〉) and QIP#k (〈restrictions〉), where k indicates the maximal number of iterations made
during each computation. In Section 5, we shall prove that QIP#0 (1qfa) $ QIP
#
1 (1qfa) $ QIP
#(1qfa).
The first separation between QIP#0 (1qfa) and QIP
#
1 (1qfa) comes from the fact that the language Odd =
{0m1z | z ∈ {0, 1}∗, z has an odd number of 0s } belongs to QIP#1 (1qfa) but it is not in QIP#0 (1qfa) since
QIP#0 (1qfa) coincides with 1QFA. In contrast, the second separation of QIP
#(1qfa) from QIP#1 (1qfa) is
exemplified by the language Zero = {x0 | x ∈ {0, 1}∗}; however, the proof of Zero 6∈ QIP#1 (1qfa) is much
more involved than the proof of Zero 6∈ 1QFA that appears in [11].
2 QFA-Verifier QIP Systems
Throughout this paper, C denotes the set of all complex numbers and ı is
√−1. Let N be the set of all
natural numbers (i.e., nonnegative integers) and set N+ = N − {0}. Given two integers m and n with
m ≤ n, the integer interval [m,n]Z is the set {m,m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , n} and Zn in particular denotes the set
[0, n− 1]Z. All logarithms are to base 2 and all polynomials have integer coefficients. An alphabet is a finite
nonempty set of “symbols” and our input alphabet Σ is not necessarily limited to {0, 1} throughout this
paper. Following the standard convention, Σ∗ denotes the set of all finite sequences of symbols from Σ, and
we write Σn = {x ∈ Σ∗ | |x| = n}, where |x| denotes the length of x. Opposed to the notation Σ∗, Σ∞ stands
for the set of all infinite sequences, each of which consists of symbols from Σ. For any symbol a in Σ, a∞
denotes an element of Σ∞, which is the infinite sequence made only of a. We assume the reader’s familiarity
with classical automata theory and the basic concepts of quantum computation (refer to, e.g., [8, 9, 14]
for its foundation). As underlying computation device, we extensively use measure-many one-way quantum
finite automata (or 1qfa’s, in short) and of measure-many two-way quantum finite automata (or 2qfa’s),
where we assume the reader’s familiarity with the definitions of those quantum automata [11]. The reader
may refer to [6] for the formal definitions of the classes IP(〈restriction〉) and AM(〈restriction〉) described
in Section 1.
2.1 Basic Model of QIP Systems
Let us review the fundamental definition of QIP system of the authors [15, 16], in which verifiers are
particularly limited to quantum finite automata. In Sections 4–5, we shall further restrict the behaviors of
those verifiers as well as provers in order to obtain three major variations of our basic QIP systems. The
reader may refer to [16, Section 3.2] for a brief discussion on the main difference between QIP systems based
on uniform quantum circuits and those based on quantum finite automata.
We use the notation (P, V ) to denote a QIP protocol executed by prover P and verifier V (whose schematic
diagram is illustrated in Figure 1). Unless there is any confusion, we also use the same notation (P, V ) to mean
a QIP system with the prover P and the verifier V . The 2qfa verifier V = (Q,Σ ∪ {|c, $},Γ, δ, q0, Qacc, Qrej)
is a 2qfa specified by a finite set Q of verifier’s inner states, an input alphabet Σ and a verifier’s transition
function δ, equipped further with a shared communication cell using a communication alphabet Γ. The set
Q is the union of three mutually disjoint subsets Qnon, Qacc, and Qrej, where any states in Qnon, Qacc, and
Qrej are respectively called a non-halting inner state, an accepting inner state, and a rejecting inner state.
In contrast to Qnon, inner states in Qacc ∪ Qrej are simply called halting inner states. In particular, Qnon
contains a so-called initial inner state q0. An input tape is indexed by natural numbers (where the first cell
is indexed 0). Two designated symbols |c and $ not appearing in Σ, which are called respectively the left
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Figure 1: A schematic view of a QIP system with a qfa verifier
endmarker and the right endmarker, mark the left end and the right end of the input on the input tape. For
our convenience, set Σˇ = Σ ∪ {|c, $}. Assume also that Γ contains a blank symbol # with which the system
(P, V ) begins in the communication cell.
The verifier’s transition function δ is a map from Q × Σˇ× Γ×Q × Γ× {0,±1} to C and is interpreted
as follows. For any q, q′ ∈ Q, σ ∈ Σˇ, γ, γ′ ∈ Γ, and d ∈ {0,±1}, the complex number δ(q, σ, γ, q′, γ′, d)
specifies the transition amplitude with which the verifier V in state q scanning symbol σ on the input tape
and symbol γ in the communication cell changes q to q′, replaces γ with γ′, and moves his tape head on the
input tape in direction d. When the tape head is located in a cell indexed t, it must move to the cell indexed
t+ d.
At the beginning of the computation, an input string x over Σ of length n is written orderly from the
first cell to the nth cell of the input tape. The tape head initially scans |c in the 0th cell. The communication
cell holds only a symbol in Γ and initially # is written in the cell. As in the original definition of 2qfa in
[11], our input tape is circular; that is, whenever the verifier’s tape head scanning |c ($, resp.) on the input
tape moves to the left (right, resp.), the tape head reaches to the right end (resp. left end) of the input tape.
Next, we shall explain two concepts of (global) configuration and visible configuration. A (global) config-
uration of the QIP protocol (P, V ) is a snapshot of a “computation” of the protocol, comprising the following
visible configurations of the two players. Each player can see only his portion of a global configuration. A vis-
ible configuration of the verifier V on an input of length n is represented by a triplet (q, k, γ) ∈ Q×Zn+2×Γ,
which indicates that the verifier is in state q, the content of the communication cell is γ, and the verifier’s
tape head position is k on the input tape. Let Vn and M be respectively the Hilbert spaces spanned by the
computational bases {|q, k〉 | (q, k) ∈ Q× Zn+2} and {|γ〉 | γ ∈ Γ}. The Hilbert space Vn ⊗M is called the
verifier’s visible configuration space on inputs of length n.
When a direction of every tape head’s move is completely determined by the pair (q′, γ′) of state q and
content γ′ of the communication cell after applying the associated transition, we call the verifier unidirectional
and use the following notation to simplify a description of the verifier’s strategy (or transition function) δ.
Assuming that the verifier V is unidirectional, a (Q × Γ)-transition Vσ of V on input symbol σ ∈ Σˇ is a
unitary operator acting on span{|q〉|γ〉 | q ∈ Q, γ ∈ Γ} of the form Vσ|q, γ〉 =
∑
q′,γ′ αq,γ,q′,γ′ |q′, γ′〉, where
q′ ∈ Q, γ′ ∈ Γ, and αq,γ,q′,γ′ ∈ C. This means that, if M scans σ in state q with γ, it changes q to q′,
γ to γ′ and the tape head moves in direction d. Since d is determined uniquely from (q′, γ′), we often
express the head direction as D(q′, γ′) = d. When d is independent of γ, by contrast, we succinctly write
D(q′) = d. The verifier’s strategy δ can be expressed as δ(q, σ, γ, q′, γ′, d) = 〈q′, γ′|Vσ|q, γ〉 if D(q′, γ′) = d,
and 0 otherwise. Notice that most 2qfa’s constructed in the past literature (for instance, [11]) actually satisfy
this unidirectional condition.
For any input x in Σ∗ of length n, δ automatically induces the linear operator Uxδ acting on the Hilbert
space Vn ⊗M defined by Uxδ |q, k, γ〉 =
∑
q′,γ′,d δ(q, x(k), γ, q
′, γ′, d)|q′, k′, γ′〉, where x(0) = |c, x(n+1) = $,
x(i) (i ∈ [1, n]Z) is the ith symbol in x, and k′ = k + d (mod n + 2). The verifier is called well-formed if
Uxδ is unitary on Vn ⊗M for every string x ∈ Σ∗. Since we are interested only in well-formed verifiers, we
henceforth assume that all verifiers should be well-formed.
Let x be any input x of length n. The 2qfa verifier V starts with the initial quantum state |q0, 0,#〉.
A single step of the verifier on x consists of the following process. First, V applies his operation Uxδ to an
existing superposition |φ〉 in Vn ⊗M and then Uxδ |φ〉 becomes a new superposition |φ′〉. Second, we define
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Wacc = span{|q, k, γ〉 | (q, k, γ) ∈ Qacc×Zn+2 ×Γ}, Wrej = span{|q, k, γ〉 | (q, k, γ) ∈ Qrej ×Zn+2×Γ}, and
Wnon = span{|q, k, γ〉 | (q, k, γ) ∈ Qnon × Zn+2 × Γ}. Moreover, let kacc, krej , and knon be respectively the
positive numbers representing “accepting,” “rejecting,” and “non halting.” The new superposition |φ′〉 is
then measured by the observable kaccEacc+krejErej+knonEnon, where Eacc, Erej , and Enon are respectively
the projection operators onto Wacc, Wrej , and Wnon. Provided that |φ′〉 is expressed as |ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉+ |ψ3〉 for
certain three vectors |ψ1〉 ∈Wacc, |ψ2〉 ∈Wrej , and |ψ3〉 ∈Wnon, we say that, at this step, V accepts x with
probability ‖|ψ1〉‖2 and rejects x with probability ‖|ψ2〉‖2. Only the non-halting superposition |ψ3〉 continues
to the next step and V is said to continue (to the next step) with probability ‖|ψ3〉‖2. The probability that
x is accepted (rejected, resp.) within the first t steps is thus the sum, over all i ∈ [1, t]Z, of the probabilities
with which V accepts (rejects, resp.) x at the ith step.
When the verifier is a 1qfa, the verifier’s transition function δ must satisfy the following additional
condition: for all q, q′ ∈ Q, σ ∈ Σˇ, and γ, γ′ ∈ Γ, it must hold that δ(q, σ, γ, q′, γ′, d) = 0 if d 6= +1 (i.e., the
tape head does not move to the right). Unlike 2qfa verifiers, a 1qfa verifier must stop running after applying
δ at scanning $ and then performing a projective measurement. In other words, the 1qfa verifier completely
stops by the time the verifier’s tape head moves off $ (thus, the tape head actually stops at |c since the input
tape is circular). Therefore, on any input x, the 1qfa verifier halts in at most |x|+ 2 steps.
In contrast to the verifier, the prover P has a semi-infinite private tape and accesses the input x and the
communication cell. For the prover’s private tape, let ∆ be a tape alphabet, which includes a special blank
symbol #. The prover is assumed to alter only a “finite” initial segment of his private tape at every step.
Let P be the Hilbert space spanned by {|y〉 | y ∈ ∆∞fin}, where ∆∞fin is the set of all infinite sequences of tape
symbols containing only a finite number of non-blank symbols. The prover’s visible configuration space is the
Hilbert space M⊗P . Formally, the prover P is specified by a series {UxP,i}x∈Σ∗,i∈N+ of unitary operators,
each of which acts on the prover’s visible configuration space, such that UxP,i is of the form S
x
P,i ⊗ I, where
dim(SxP,i) is finite and I is the identity operator. Such a series of operators is often called the prover’s strategy
on the input x. To refer to the strategy on x, we often use the notation Px; namely, Px = {UxP,i}i∈N+ . With
this notation, the prover can be expressed as {Px}x∈Σ∗ . If the prover has string y ∈ ∆∞fin on his private tape
and scans symbol γ in the communication cell, then he applies UxP,i to the quantum state |γ〉|y〉 at the ith
step of the prover’s turn. If UxP,i|γ〉|y〉 =
∑
γ′,y′ α
i
γ′,y′ |γ′〉|y′〉, then the prover changes y into y′ and replaces
γ by γ′ with amplitude αiγ′,y′ .
A (global) configuration consists of the four items: V ’s inner state, V ’s tape head position, the content
of the communication cell, and the content of P ’s private tape. We express a superposition of such config-
urations of (P, V ) on input x as a vector in the Hilbert space V|x| ⊗M ⊗ P , which is called the (global)
configuration space of (P, V ) on the input x; in other words, a (global) configuration is a pure quantum state
of the form |q, k〉|γ〉|y〉, indicating that V is in inner state q, its tape head is at cell k, γ is in the commu-
nication cell, and P ’s private tape contains y. A global configuration ξ is called a halting configuration (a
non-halting configuration, resp.) if ξ contains a halting (non-halting, resp.) inner state of V .
A computation of the QIP protocol (P, V ) on the input x constitutes a series of superpositions of con-
figurations resulting from alternate applications of unitary operations of the prover P and the verifier V
including his projective measurements in the following manner. The computation of (P, V ) on x starts
with the global initial configuration |q0, 0〉|#〉|#∞〉, where the verifier is in his initial configuration and the
prover’s private tape consists only of the blank symbol #. The two players P and V apply their unitary
operators Px and U
x
δ (as well as measurements) in turn, starting with the verifier’s move. A projective
measurement is made after every move of the verifier to determine whether V is in a halting inner state.
Through the communication cell, the two players exchange communication symbols, which naturally cause
the two players to be entangled. When the prover (verifier, resp.) writes symbol σ ∈ Γ in the communica-
tion cell, we customarily say that the prover (verifier, resp.) sends σ to the verifier (prover., resp.), where
σ is viewed as a “message.” More precisely, when |q, k〉|γ〉|y〉 is a current global configuration, V changes
it into (Uxδ ⊗ I1)|q, k〉|γ〉|y〉 = Uxδ |q, k〉|γ〉 ⊗ |y〉, where I1 is the identity operator acting on P . After V
applies the projective measurement Enon, the global configuration becomes (Enon⊗ I1)(Uxδ ⊗ I1)|q, k〉|γ〉|y〉.
Finally, P changes |q, k〉|γ〉|y〉 into (I2 ⊗ UxP,i)|q, k〉|γ〉|y〉 = |q, k〉 ⊗ UxP,i|γ〉|y〉, where I2 is the identity op-
erator acting on V|x|. A superposition |Φi〉 of global configurations at the ith step is defined recursively as
|Φ0〉 = |q0, 0〉|#〉|#∞〉, |Φ2i+1〉 = (Enon ⊗ I1)(Uxδ ⊗ I1)|Φ2i〉, and |Φ2i+2〉 = (I2 ⊗ UxP,i+1)|Φ2i+1〉 for every
i ∈ N. For example, the superposition of global configurations after the 2i+ 1st step becomes
(Enon ⊗ I1)(Uxδ ⊗ I1)(I2 ⊗ UxP,i) · · · (Uxδ ⊗ I1)(I2 ⊗ UxP,1)(Enon ⊗ I1)(Uxδ ⊗ I1)|q0, 0〉|#〉|#∞〉.
The series |Φ0〉, |Φ1〉, . . . therefore becomes a computation of (P, V ) on x.
Given any global configuration ξ, a local computation path ending with (or leading to) ξ in computa-
tion (|Φ0〉, |Φ1〉, . . . , |Φn〉) of the QIP protocol (P, V ) on a given input is a series (ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξm) of global
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configurations satisfying the following four conditions: |ξ0〉 = |q0, 0〉|#〉|#∞〉, (Enon ⊗ I1)(Uxδ ⊗ I1)|ξ2i〉 con-
tains |ξ2i+1〉 with non-zero amplitude for all i ∈ [0, ⌊(m− 1)/2⌋]Z, (I2 ⊗ UxP,i+1)|ξ2i+1〉 contains |ξ2i+2〉 with
non-zero amplitude for all i ∈ [0, ⌊(m − 2)/2⌋]Z, and ξm equals ξ. Moreover, a (global) computation path
ending with ξ is a local computation path (ξ0, ξ1, . . . , ξm) ending with ξ for which |ξi〉 appears in |Φi〉 with
non-zero amplitude for every i ∈ [0,m]Z. Each (global) computation path ends when V enters a certain
halting inner state along this computation path. Furthermore, we define the overall probability that (P, V )
accepts (rejects, resp.) the input x to be the limit, as t → ∞, of the probability that V accepts (rejects,
resp.) x within the first t steps. We use the notation pacc(x, P, V ) (prej(x, P, V ), resp.) to denote the overall
acceptance (rejection, resp.) probability of x by (P, V ). We say that V always halts with probability 1 if, for
every input x and every prover P ∗, the QIP protocol (P ∗, V ) reaches halting inner states with probability
1. In general, V may not always halt with probability 1. Notice that, when we discuss the entire running
time of the QIP system, we count the number of all steps taken by the verifier (including measurements) as
well as the prover.
Let a and b be any two real numbers in the unit real interval [0, 1] and let L be any language. We say that
L has an (a, b)-QIP system (P, V ) (or an (a, b)-QIP system (P, V ) recognizes L) if (P, V ) is a QIP system
and the following two conditions hold for the corresponding QIP protocol (P, V ):
1. (completeness) for any x ∈ L, the QIP protocol (P, V ) accepts x with probability at least a, and
2. (soundness¶) for any x 6∈ L and any prover P ∗, the QIP protocol (P ∗, V ) rejects x with probability at
least b.
Note that an (a, a)-QIP system has the error probability at most 1 − a. This paper discusses only the
QIP systems whose error probabilities are bounded from above by certain constants lying in the real interval
[0, 1/2). For this reason, we simply say that L has a QIP system if there exists a constant (an error bound)
ǫ ∈ [0, 1/2) such that L has a (1− ǫ, 1− ǫ)-QIP system.
Given any pair a, b ∈ [0, 1], the notation QIPa,b(〈R〉), where 〈R〉 is a set of restrictions, denotes a class
of all languages recognized by certain (a, b)-QIP systems with the restrictions specified by 〈R〉. In addition,
we define QIP(〈R〉) as the union ⋃ǫ>0QIP1/2+ǫ,1/2+ǫ(〈R〉). In this paper, we shall focus our attention
on the following three basic restrictions 〈R〉: 〈1qfa〉 (i.e., 1qfa verifiers), 〈2qfa〉 (i.e., 2qfa verifiers), and
〈poly-time〉 (i.e., expected polynomial running time). As an example, QIP(2qfa, poly-time) denotes the lan-
guage class defined by QIP systems with expected polynomial-time 2qfa verifiers. Other types of restrictions
will be discussed in later sections.
3 What if Provers Behave Classically?
To promote a better understanding of the roles of provers in our QIP systems described in Section 2.1, we
shall examine a variant of those systems. Recall that, in Dwork-Stockmeyer IP systems [6], mighty provers
are in essence probabilistic machines that probabilistically select messages to send to verifiers. As noted
in [6], it is possible to reduce those provers to deterministic machines without compromising the language
recognition power of the corresponding IP systems.
Naturally, we can ask whether or not standard “quantum” provers in our QIP systems can be replaced
by significantly weaker machines. Among many candidates for weak machines, we consider machines that
operate only unitary operators whose entries are all limited to 0 and 1. Significance of such operators is that,
using a semi-infinite private tape, those restricted operators essentially make their corresponding provers
reduce to merely deterministic machines. Certainly, a real-life implementation of such restricted operators
could be much simpler and easier than implementing arbitrary unitary operators. For those reasons, we call
a prover classical‖ if the prover’s move is dictated by unitary operators whose entries are 0s and 1s.
In comparison, we refer to the original provers (described in Section 2.1) as quantum provers. Remember
that classical provers are still quantum provers. Hereafter, the restriction 〈c-prover〉 indicates that all provers
behave classically as defined above. In our QIP systems, classical provers may play an essentially different
role from quantum provers.
Let us examine the power of classical-prover QIP systems when verifiers are limited to 1qfa’s. It is not
difficult to prove that 1QFA ⊆ QIP(1qfa, c-prover) by forcing provers to unalter the communication cell at
any step. However, it is not clear whether QIP(1qfa, c-prover) coincides with QIP(1qfa). In what follows,
we shall demonstrate that QIP(1qfa, c-prover) actually contains QIP(1qfa).
¶As Lipton [12] demonstrated, this form of the soundness condition cannot be, in general, replaced by the following weaker
form: “(P, V ) accepts x with probability at most 1− b.” See [6] for a discussion.
‖In a strict sense, a more exact analogy to deterministic prover may demand that even a communication cell behaves
classically.
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Proposition 3.1 QIP(1qfa) ⊆ QIP(1qfa, c-prover).
Proof. It was shown in [16, Proposition 4.2] that REG ⊆ QIP1,1(1qfa). In a similar way, we can
prove that REG ⊆ QIP(1qfa, c-prover). Since QIP(1qfa) = REG [16, Theorem 4.1], we obtain the desired
containment QIP(1qfa) ⊆ QIP(1qfa, c-prover). ✷
Next, we shall examine the case of 2qfa verifiers. Unlike the 1qfa-verifier case, any contain-
ment between QIP(2qfa) and QIP(2qfa, c-prover) is currently unknown; nonetheless, we can verify
that QIP(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover) contains 2QFA(poly-time). Therefore, the proper inclusion REG $
QIP(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover) follows as a direct consequence of the result REG $ 2QFA(poly-time) [11].
The following theorem further strengthens this separation to Arthur-Merlin proof systems.
Theorem 3.2 1. AM(2pfa) $ QIP(2qfa, c-prover).
2. AM(2pfa, poly-time) $ QIP(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover) * AM(2pfa).
Proof. In a quantum-prover model, it was shown in [16, Lemma 5.2] that the language Pal# =
{x#xR | x ∈ {0, 1}∗} (where xR is x in the reverse order) of marked even-length palindromes be-
longs to QIP(2qfa, poly-time). By a careful examination of the proof, we find that the same proof
works for classical provers. This fact immediately places Pal# into QIP(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover).
Hence, the non-containment of QIP(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover) inside AM(2pfa) naturally follows be-
cause Pal# is located outside of AM(2pfa) [6]. This separation further leads to the difference between
AM(2pfa) and QIP(2qfa, c-prover). Similarly, we can show the difference between AM(2pfa, poly-time)
and QIP(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover) since, if they are equal, we obtain QIP(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover) ⊆
AM(2pfa, poly-time) ⊆ AM(2pfa), contradicting the earlier non-containment.
To complete the proof, we shall prove that AM(2pfa) ⊆ QIP(2qfa, c-prover). Since the proof that begins
below works for any time-bounded model, we also obtain the remaining claim that AM(2pfa, poly-time) ⊆
QIP(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover).
Let L be any language in AM(2pfa) over alphabet Σ. We want to show that L is also in
QIP(2qfa, c-prover). The important starting point is a fact that L can be recognized as follows by spe-
cial finite automata M called 2npfa’s [5] that make probabilistic moves and nondeterministic moves in turn.
If x ∈ L, then there exists a series of nondeterministic choices by which M halts in accepting states with
probability at least 1− ǫ; otherwise, for every series of nondeterministic choices, M halts in rejecting states
with probability at least 1− ǫ, where ǫ is an appropriate constant in [0, 1/2).
Now, we take a 2npfa M = (Q, Σˇ, δM , q0, Qacc, Qrej) with nondeterministic states and probabilistic
states that recognizes L with error probability at most ǫ, where 0 ≤ ǫ < 1/2 and Q is made up of four
disjoint sets QR (a set of probabilistic states), QN (a set of nondeterministic states), Qacc (a set of accepting
states) and Qrej (a set of rejecting states). To simplify our proof, we force M to satisfy the following
two extra conditions: (i) M ’s tape head does not stay still at any step and (ii) whenever M tosses a fair
coin, the tape head moves only to the right. It is not difficult to modify any 2npfa to meet those two
conditions. Let us recall the transitions of 2npfa’s from [5]. Given any (p, σ, q, d) ∈ Q × Σˇ × Q × {±1},
a transition δM (p, σ, q, d) takes a value in {0, 1/2, 1} in the following manner. (1) When p ∈ QR, there
exist two distinct states p0, p1 ∈ Q for which δM (p, σ, q, d) = 1/2 holds if (q, d) ∈ {(p0, 1), (p1, 1)}, and
δM (p, σ, q, d) = 0 otherwise. This indicates that M changes its inner state from p to each of p0 and p1
with equal probability 1/2 and moves its tape head rightward (by Condition (ii)). (2) In the case where
p ∈ QN , there are m (∈ N+) pairs (p1, d1), (p2, d2), . . . , (pm, dm) ∈ Q × {±1} for which δM (p, σ, q, d) = 1
holds if (q, d) ∈ {(p1, d1), . . . , (pm, dm)}, and δM (p, σ, q, d) = 0 otherwise. This means that M chooses an
index i ∈ [1,m]Z nondeterministically, changes the inner state from p to pi, and moves the tape head to
the left (di = −1) or to the right (di = 1). Notice that deterministic moves are always treated as a special
case of nondeterministic moves. Based on the above machine M , we shall construct the desired QIP system
(P, V ) with classical prover P for L.
Let x be any input string of length n. Let Q′ = Q ∪ {pˆ | p ∈ Q} be a set of inner states and let
Γ = (Q′ × {±1}) ∪ {#, κ} be a communication alphabet, where pˆ is a new inner state associated with p
and κ is a fresh non-blank symbol. The verifier V carries out the procedure that follows δM , by which V
simulates M step by step.
Let us consider any step at which M tosses a fair coin in probabilistic state p by applying a transition
δM (p, σ, p0, 1) = δM (p, σ, p1, 1) = 1/2 for two distinct states p0, p1 ∈ Q. The verifier V checks whether
# is in the communication cell. Unless this is the case, V rejects x immediately; otherwise, V makes the
corresponding (Q×Γ)-transition Vσ|p〉|#〉 = 1√2 (|p0〉|(p, 1)〉+ |p1〉|(p, 1)〉) with D(p0, (p, 1)) = D(p1, (p, 1)) =
+1. The verifier expects a prover to erase the symbol (p, 1) in the communication cell by overwriting it with
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#. This erasure of symbols guarantees V ’s move to be unitary.
Next, let us consider any step at which M makes a nondeterministic choice (p, d) in state p ∈ QN ,
namely, δM (p, σ, q, d) = 1, where m ∈ N+ and (q, d) ∈ {(p1, d1), . . . , (pm, dm)} ⊆ Q × {±1}. For this M ’s
step, V needs two steps to simulate it. The verifier V enters a rejecting inner state immediately unless the
communication cell contains #. Now, assume that # is in the communication cell. Without moving its tape
head, V first sends the designated symbol κ to a prover, requesting a pair (p′, d′) in Q × {±1} to return.
This is done by the special (Q × Γ)-transition Vσ|p〉|#〉 = |pˆ〉|κ〉 with D(pˆ, κ) = 0. The verifier forces a
prover to return a valid form of nondeterministic choice (namely, δM (p, σ, p
′, d′) = 1) by entering a rejecting
inner state whenever the prover writes any other symbol. Once V receives a valid pair (pi, di), he makes
the (Q× Γ)-transition Vσ|pˆ〉|(pi, di)〉 = |pi〉|(pˆ, di)〉 with D(pi, (pˆ, di)) = di and expects a prover to erase the
communication symbol (pˆ, di).
The honest prover P must blank out the communication cell at the end of every simulation step of V and,
in request of V with the symbol κ, P returns a “correct” nondeterministic choice to V (if any). Assuming
x ∈ L, there are a series of nondeterministic choices along which M accepts x with probability at least 1− ǫ.
Since the honest prover P sends such a series step by step, P can guide V to make correct nondeterministic
choices. Moreover, P allows V to simulate correctly M ’s probabilistic moves by erasing V ’s communication
symbols. Hence, V successfully reachesM ’s outcomes with the same error probability, and thus the protocol
(P, V ) accepts x with probability at least 1− ǫ.
Next, consider the case where x 6∈ L. Notice that no matter how nondeterministic choices are made, M
rejects x with probability at least 1− ǫ. Take a dishonest classical prover P ∗ that maximizes the acceptance
probability of V on x. This particular prover P ∗ must clear out the communication cell whenever V
asks him to do so since, otherwise, V immediately rejects x and thus lowers the acceptance probability, a
contradiction against the choice of P ∗. Since P ∗ is classical, all the computation paths of V have nonnegative
amplitudes, which cause only non-destructive interference. This indicates that P ∗ cannot annihilate any
existing computation path of V . On request for a nondeterministic choice, P ∗ must return any one of valid
nondeterministic choices since, otherwise, V rejects immediately. With a series of nondeterministic choices
of P ∗, if V rejects x with probability less than 1− ǫ, then our simulation implies that M also rejects x with
probability less than 1 − ǫ. This is a contradiction against our assumption. Hence, V must reject x with
probability at least 1− ǫ. Therefore, (P, V ) is a classical-prover (1− ǫ, 1− ǫ)-QIP system for L. ✷
In the above proof, we cannot replace classical provers by quantum provers, mainly because a certain
quantum prover may fool the constructed verifier by (i) returning a superposition of nondeterministic choices
instead of choosing one of the two nondeterministic choices and (ii) using negative amplitudes to make the
verifier’s quantum simulation destructive.
In the end of this section, we shall present a QIP protocol using classical provers for the non-regular
language Center = {x1y | x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗, |x| = |y|}, which is known to be in AM(2pfa) but not in
AM(2pfa, poly-time) [6]. In the QIP protocol described in the next proof, an honest prover signals the
location of the center bit of a given input and then a verifier tests the correctness of the location by employ-
ing the quantum Fourier transform (or QFT, in short) in a fashion similar to [11]. An interaction in a QIP
protocol constitutes a verifier’s transition, a projective measurement, and a prover’s move.
Lemma 3.3 For any constant ǫ ∈ (0, 1), Center ∈ QIP1,1−ǫ(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover).
Proof. Let ǫ be any error bound in the real interval (0, 1) and set N = ⌈1/ǫ⌉. In
what follows, we shall define the desired QIP protocol that witnesses the membership of Center to
QIP1,1−ǫ(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover). Let Σ = {0, 1} be our input alphabet and let Γ = {#, 1} be our
communication alphabet. Our QIP protocol (P, V ) comprises four phases. The formal description of the
behavior of V is given in Table 1 using (Q× Γ)-transitions {Vσ}σ∈Σˇ. Let x be an arbitrary input.
1) In the first phase, the verifier V checks whether |x| is odd by moving the tape head toward $ together
with switching two inner states q0 and q1. To make deterministic moves during this phase, V forces a prover
to return only the blank symbol # at any step by entering a rejecting state whenever the prover deceptively
sends back non-blank symbols. When |x| is odd, V enters the inner state q3 after moving its tape head back
to |c. Hereafter, we consider only the case where the input x has an odd length.
2) In the second phase, V moves its tape head rightward by sending # to a prover until V receives 1
from the prover. Receiving 1 from the prover, V willingly rejects x unless its tape head is currently scanning
1 on the input tape. Otherwise, the third phase starts. During the third and fourth phases, whenever the
prover changes the communication symbol 1 to #, V immediately rejects the input.
3) Assume that the tape head is now scanning 1 on the input tape. In the third phase, the computation
splits into N parallel branches by applying V1|q3〉|1〉. This step is called the first split and it generates
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V|c|q0〉|#〉 = |q0〉|#〉 V$|q0〉|#〉 = |qrej,0〉|#〉
V|c|q2〉|1〉 = |qrej,0〉|#〉 V$|q0〉|1〉 = |qrej,1〉|#〉
V|c|q2〉|#〉 = |q3〉|#〉 V$|q1〉|#〉 = |q2〉|#〉
V|c|sj,0〉|1〉 = 1√N
∑N
l=1
exp(2piıjl/N)|tl〉|#〉 (1 ≤ j ≤ N) V$|q1〉|1〉 = |qrej,1〉|1〉
V$|rj,0〉|1〉 = |s
′
j,0〉|1〉 (1 ≤ j ≤ N)
V$|s
′
j,0〉|1〉 = |sj,0〉|1〉 (1 ≤ j ≤ N)
Vb|q0〉|#〉 = |q1〉|#〉 Vb|q1〉|#〉 = |q0〉|#〉
Vb|q0〉|1〉 = |qrej,0〉|#〉 Vb|q1〉|1〉 = |qrej,0〉|1〉
Vb|q2〉|#〉 = |q2〉|#〉 Vb|q2〉|1〉 = |qrej,1〉|1〉
Vb|q3〉|#〉 = |q3〉|#〉
V1|q3〉|1〉 =
1√
N
∑N
j=1
|rj,0〉|#〉 V0|q3〉|1〉 = |qrej,−1〉|#〉
Vb|rj,0〉|1〉 = |r
′
j,N−j〉|1〉 (1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1) Vb|rj,0〉|#〉 = |qrej,j〉|1〉 (1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1)
Vb|rj,k〉|1〉 = |r
′
j,k〉|1〉 (1 ≤ k ≤ N − j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1) Vb|rN,0〉|1〉 = |rN,0〉|1〉
Vb|r
′
j,k〉|1〉 = |rj,k−1〉|1〉 (2 ≤ k ≤ N − j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1)
Vb|r
′
j,1〉|1〉 = |rj,0〉|1〉, (1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1)
Vb|sj,k〉|1〉 = |sj,k−1〉|1〉 (2 ≤ k ≤ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N) Vb|sj,0〉|1〉 = |sj,j〉|1〉 (1 ≤ j ≤ N)
Vb|sj,1〉|1〉 = |sj,0〉|1〉 (1 ≤ j ≤ N) Vb|sj,0〉|#〉 = |qrej,N+j〉|#〉 (1 ≤ j ≤ N)
D(q0) = D(q1) = D(q3) = 1, D(q2) = −1 D(rj,0) = 1 (1 ≤ j ≤ N)
D(rj,k) = D(r
′
j,k) = 0 (1 ≤ j ≤ N − 1, k 6= 0) D(sj,0) = −1 (1 ≤ j ≤ N)
D(sj,k) = D(s
′
j,0) = 0 (1 ≤ j ≤ N , k 6= 0) D(tj) = 0 (1 ≤ j ≤ N)
Table 1: (Q × Γ)-transitions {Vσ}σ∈Σˇ of V for Center with b ∈ {0, 1}. Here, tN is a unique accepting inner state,
while qrej,j (−1 ≤ j ≤ 2N−1) and tl (1 ≤ l < N) are all rejecting inner states. The table excludes obvious transitions
to rejecting inner states when a prover changes the communication symbol 1 to # during the third and fourth phases.
the N distinct inner states r1,0, r2,0, . . . , rN,0 with equal amplitudes 1/
√
N . The tape head then moves
deterministically toward $ in the following manner: along the jth computation path (1 ≤ j ≤ N) associated
with the inner state rj,0, the tape head idles for 2(N − j) steps in each tape cell before moving to the next
one by changing inner states as
rj,0
1−→ r′j,N−j 0−→ rj,N−j−1 0−→ r′j,N−j−1 0−→ rj,N−j−2 0−→ · · · 0−→ r′j,1 0−→ rj,0,
where each number over arrows indicates the direction of the tape head. When the tape head reaches $, it
steps back one cell by applying V$|rj,0〉|1〉 and V$|s′j,0〉|1〉, and then starts the fourth phase.
4) During the fourth phase, the tape head along the jth computation path keeps moving leftward by
idling in each cell for j steps, changing inner states as
sj,0
0−→ sj,j 0−→ sj,j−1 0−→ sj,j−2 0−→ · · · 0−→ sj,1 −1−−→ sj,0
until the tape head reaches |c. At |c, the computation splits again into N parallel branches (called the second
split) by applying the QFT V|c|sj,0〉|1〉, yielding either the accepting inner state tN or one of the rejecting
inner states in {tj | 1 ≤ j < N}.
From Table 1, it is not difficult to check that V is indeed well-formed (namely, Uxδ is unitary for every
x ∈ Σ∗). The honest prover P should return 1 exactly at the time when V scans the center bit of an input
string and at the time when V sends # to P during the third and fourth phases. At any other step, P
should apply the identity operator.
Now, we shall check the completeness and soundness of the obtained QIP system (P, V ) for Center.
First, consider a positive instance x, which is of the form y1z for certain strings y and z of the same length,
say, n. Since the honest prover P signals just before V reads the center bit 1 of x, the first split given by
V1|q3〉|1〉 = 1√N
∑N
j=1 |rj,0〉|#〉 occurs at the middle of x during the third phase (more precisely, exactly
after n steps of V from the start of the second phase) after reading |cy1. Along the jth computation path
(1 ≤ j ≤ N) associated with the inner state rj,0 chosen at the first split, V idles for 2n(N − j) steps while
reading z and also idles for 2nj steps while reading the whole input. Overall, the idling time elapses for the
duration of 2n(N−j)+2nj = 2nN , which is independent of j. Hence, all the N computation paths created at
the aforementioned first split must have the same length, and thus the superposition of global configurations
prior to the second split becomes 1√
N
∑N
j=1 |sj,0, 0〉|#〉|Ψ〉 for an appropriate quantum state |Ψ〉 in the
Hilbert space P associated with the prover’s private tape. The QFT given by the transition V|c|sj,0〉|1〉 =
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1√
N
∑N
l=1 exp(2πıjl/N)|tl〉|#〉 makes all the global configurations converge to the verifier’s visible accepting
configuration |tN 〉|#〉; that is, 1√N
∑N
l=1
(
1√
N
∑N
j=1 exp(2πıjl/N)
)
|tl, 0〉|#〉|Ψ〉, which equals |tN , 0〉|#〉|Ψ〉.
Therefore, V accepts x with probability 1.
On the contrary, suppose that x is a negative instance of the form x = y0z with |y| = |z| = n. Consider
the second, third, and fourth phases. To minimize the rejection probability, a dishonest prover P ∗ must
send the symbol 1 just before V scans 1 on the input tape during the second phase and then P ∗ must
maintain 1 because, otherwise, V immediately rejects x. Note that there is no way for classical provers to
pass both 1 and # in a form of superposition to deceive the verifier. Let us assume that the eth symbol
of x is 1 and P ∗ sends 1 during the eth interaction, where 1 ≤ e ≤ 2n + 1. Obviously, e 6= n + 1 follows
because the center bit of x is 0. Consider the first split caused by applying V1|q3〉|1〉 = 1√N
∑N
j=1 |rj,0〉|#〉.
For each index j ∈ [1, N ]Z, let pj be the computation path following the jth branch that starts with
the inner state rj,0 generated at the first split. Along this computation path pj, the idling time totals
2(|x| − e)(N − j) + 2nj = 2(n + 1 − e)(N − j) + 2nN . Since 1 ≤ j ≤ N , two computation paths pj and
pj′ for any distinct values j and j
′ must have different lengths. Just before the second split, along the jth
computation path, we obtain a quantum state 1√
N
|sj,0, 0〉|#〉|Ψj〉+ |∆j〉, where |∆j〉 does not contain |sj,0〉.
At the second split, the QFT further generatesN parallel branches 1N
∑N
j=1 exp(2πıjl/N)|tl, 0〉|#〉|Ψj〉+|∆′j〉,
which equals 1N |tN , 0〉|#〉|Ψj〉+|∆′′j 〉, where |∆′j〉 is obtained from |∆j〉 by the QFT and |∆′′〉 is an appropriate
quantum state not containing |tN 〉. Thus, at most one of the computation paths can reach |tN , 0〉|#〉. Hence,
the probability of V reaching such an acceptance configuration is no more than 1/N2. Since there are N
computation paths {pj}1≤j≤N generated at the first split, the overall acceptance probability is at most
N × (1/N2) = 1/N . Since V ’s computation paths always end with certain halting states, it follows that V
rejects x with probability ≥ 1− 1/N ≥ 1− ǫ. ✷
4 What If a Verifier Reveals Private Information?
In Dwork-Stockmeyer IP systems [6], the prover’s view of the verifier’s computation is limited to a small
window (i.e., a communication cell) and the strength of a prover’s strategy hinges on the amount of the
information that a verifier is willing to reveal to the prover through this window. Let us consider a situation,
in their IP system, that a verifier always unalters the communication cell. Since the behavior of a 2pfa
verifier depends on not only messages from a prover but also its internal random choices (or its coin flips),
no prover can gain more than the information on the number of the verifier’s moves, and therefore any prover
knows little of the verifier’s actual configurations.
In Babai’s Arthur-Merlin proof systems [3] (also known as “public-coin” IP systems [7]), on the contrary,
the verifier must always pass the information on his next move resulting from his internal random choices,
and such information suffices for the mighty prover to keep track of the verifier’s configurations. Dwork and
Stockmeyer [6] defined AM(〈restriction〉) as a variant of their original IP systems by requiring their verifiers
to publicly reveal next inner states and tape head directions determined by internal coin flips.
Here, we shall consider a straightforward quantum analogy of the above public-coin IP systems and
investigate their language recognition power. In our QIP system, we demand the verifier to reveal through
the communication cell his choice of non-halting inner state as well as his tape head direction at every step.
Formally, we define a public QIP system as follows, whereas we sometimes call the original QIP systems
defined in Section 2.1 private QIP systems in comparison.
Definition 4.1 A 2qfa-verifier QIP system (P, V ) is called public∗∗ if the verifier’s linear operators
{Uxδ }x∈Σ∗ induced by δ satisfy the following publicness condition: for any tuple (x, q, k, γ), if q is a non-
halting state, then Uxδ |q, k, γ〉 must be of the form
∑
q′,ξ,d δ(q, x(k), γ, q
′, ξ, d)|q′, k+d (mod |x|+2), ξ〉, where
ξ = (q′, d), x(0) = |c, and x(|x|+1) = $.
In particular, when the verifier V is a 1qfa, we omit the information on tape head direction d from
the communication symbol ξ = (q′, d) in Definition 4.1 since V always moves its tape head to the right
(i.e., d = +1) and the information on d is obviously redundant. To emphasize the “publicness” of this new
system, we use the specific notation 〈public〉. For instance, QIP(2qfa, public) indicates a collection of all
languages recognized by public QIP systems with 2qfa verifiers. By direct analogy with AM(2pfa), however,
we might possibly write QAM(2qfa) for QIP(2qfa, public). In Definition 4.1, since there is no restriction on
∗∗As another variant of public QIP system, we may require Ux
δ
|q, k, γ〉 to satisfy the same equality only for non-halting states
q′, instead of q. See [15] for more details.
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provers, all public QIP systems with 1qfa verifiers are naturally private QIP systems with the same verifiers.
It therefore holds that, for example, QIP(1qfa, public) ⊆ QIP(1qfa) and QIP(2qfa, public) ⊆ QIP(2qfa).
We shall further demonstrate the power of public QIP systems. Now, we shall concentrate on the
language class QIP(1qfa, public). Unlike 1QFA ⊆ QIP(1qfa), the containment 1QFA ⊆ QIP(1qfa, public),
which seems to hold naturally at a quick glance, is still unknown. The difficulty of proving this containment
is caused by the publicness condition of the public QIP systems. Because the verifier must announce its
next move to a prover, he unintentionally helps the prover make his local system entangled with the prover’s
local system; however, we do not know how to get rid of this type of entanglement.
Despite the publicness condition, we can still show that the power of QIP(1qfa, public) is well beyond
1QFA. Let us consider the language Zero = {w0 | w ∈ {0, 1}∗} in QIP(1qfa, public), which is known to
reside outside of 1QFA [11]. In the next lemma, we shall prove that Zero has a public QIP system with 1qfa
verifiers.
Lemma 4.2 Zero ∈ QIP1,1(1qfa, public).
The following proof exploits the prover’s ability to inform the location of the rightmost bit 0 of an instance
in Zero. To simplify the description of 1qfa verifiers V = (Q, Σˇ, δ, q0, Qacc, Qrej), for each q ∈ Q, we intend
to abbreviate the communication symbol (q, 1) as q, because V ’s tape head direction is always +1.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Let us show that Zero has a public (1, 1)-QIP system (P, V ) with 1qfa verifier
V . To describe the desired protocol (P, V ), let Σ = {0, 1} be its input alphabet and let Qnon = {q0, q1},
Qacc = {qacc,0, qacc,1, qacc,−1} and Qrej = {qrej,i, q′rej,i | i ∈ {0,±1}} be respectively the sets of non-halting
inner states, of accepting inner states, and of rejecting inner states of V . Using the above-mentioned
abbreviation, our communication alphabet Γ can be defined as {#, q0, q1}.
The protocol of V is described in the following. See Table 2 for the formal description of V ’s (Q × Γ)-
transitions. Let x = yb be any input string, where b ∈ {0, 1}. The verifier V stays in the initial state q0
by publicly announcing q0 (i.e., sending the communication symbol q0 to a prover) until the prover returns
#. Whenever V receives #, he immediately rejects x by entering qrej,−1 (after applying either V$|q0〉|#〉
or V1|q0〉|#〉) if its current scanning symbol is different from 0. On the contrary, if V is scanning 0, then
he waits for the next tape symbol by entering q1. If the next symbol is $, then he accepts x after applying
V$|q1〉|q1〉; otherwise, he rejects x by entering q′rej,i (after applying either V0|q1〉|qi〉 or V1|q1〉|qi〉). Our honest
prover P does not alter the communication cell until V reaches the right end of |cy and P must return #
just before V reads the symbol b so that V can apply Vb|q1〉|#〉.
V|c|q0〉|#〉 = |q0〉|q0〉 V0|q0〉|#〉 = |q1〉|q1〉 V1|q0〉|#〉 = |qrej,−1〉|qrej,−1〉
V|c|q0〉|qj〉 = |qrej,j〉|qrej,j〉 V0|q0〉|q0〉 = |q0〉|q0〉 V1|q0〉|q0〉 = |q0〉|q0〉
V|c|q1〉|qi〉 = |q′rej,i〉|q′rej,i〉 V0|q0〉|q1〉 = |qrej,1〉|qrej,1〉 V1|q0〉|q1〉 = |qrej,1〉|qrej,1〉
V$|q0〉|qi〉 = |qrej,i〉|qrej,i〉 V0|q1〉|qi〉 = |q′rej,i〉|q′rej,i〉 V1|q1〉|qi〉 = |q′rej,i〉|q′rej,i〉
V$|q1〉|qi〉 = |qacc,i〉|qacc,i〉
Table 2: (Q× Γ)-transitions {Vσ}σ∈Σˇ of V for Zero with i ∈ {0,±1} and j ∈ {0, 1}. The symbol q−1 denotes #.
It still remains to prove that (P, V ) recognizes Zero with certainty. Consider the case where our input x
is of the form y0 for a certain string y. Since x is in Zero, the honest prover P returns # just after V reads
the rightmost symbol of |cy. This information helps V locate the end of y. Moving its tape head rightward,
V confirms that the next scanning symbols are 0$ and then enters an accepting inner state (either qacc,0,
qacc,1, or qacc,−1) with probability 1. On the contrary, assume that x = y1. Clearly, the best adversary P ∗
needs to return either q0 or # (or their superposition). If P
∗ keeps returning q0, then V eventually rejects
x and increases the rejection probability. Since V ’s computation is essentially deterministic, this strategy
only decreases the chance of cheating by P ∗. To make the best of the adversary’s strategy, P ∗ must return
the communication symbol # just before V scans 0. Nonetheless, when P ∗ returns #, V applies V0|q0〉|#〉
and then applies V0|q1〉|qi〉 or V1|q1〉|qi〉, where i ∈ {0,±1} and q−1 = #. Obviously, this leads to a rejecting
inner state of V with certainty. Therefore, the QIP system (P, V ) recognizes Zero with certainty. ✷
It follows from Lemma 4.2 that QIP(1qfa, public) is powerful enough to contain certain languages that
cannot be recognized by 1qfa’s alone. It is also possible to show that QIP(1qfa, public) contains all languages
recognized by 1qfa’s whose transition amplitudes are limited to {0, 1}. Those 1qfa’s are known as 1-way
(deterministic) reversible finite automaton (1rfa, in short) [1]. For our convenience, let 1RFA denote the
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collection of all languages recognized by such 1rfa’s. As Ambainis and Freivalds [1] showed, 1RFA is char-
acterized exactly as the collection of all languages that can be recognized by 1qfa’s with success probability
≥ 7/9 + ǫ for certain constants ǫ > 0.
Theorem 4.3 1RFA $ QIP1,1(1qfa, public) * 1QFA.
Proof. Firstly, we shall show that QIP1,1(1qfa, public) contains 1RFA. Take an arbitrary set L recognized
by a 1rfa M = (Q, Σˇ, δM , q0, Qacc, Qrej), where δM is a reversible transition function [1] from Q × Σˇ × Q
to {0, 1}. This δM satisfies that (i) for any pair (p, σ) ∈ Q × Σˇ, there exists a unique inner state q ∈ Q for
which δM (p, σ, q) = 1 and (ii) for any (q, σ) ∈ Q × Σˇ, there is at most one p ∈ Q satisfying δM (p, σ, q) = 1.
Henceforth, we shall construct a public (1, 1)-QIP system (P, V ) that “mimics” a computation of M .
The desired 1qfa verifier V = (Q′, Σˇ,Γ, δ, q0, Q′acc, Q
′
rej) behaves as follows. Let Q
′
acc = Qacc, Q
′
rej =
Qrej ∪ {qrej,p,q | p ∈ Qnon, q ∈ Q, p 6= q}, and Q′ = Γ = Q ∪ Q′rej , provided that qrej,p,q’s are all fresh
symbols not in Q. Assume that V is in inner state p, scanning symbol b on an input tape. Whenever
M changes its inner state from p to q after scanning b, V does so by revealing its next inner state q to a
prover. As soon as V finds that the communication symbol has been altered intentionally by the prover, V
immediately rejects the input. This process forces any prover to unalter the content of the communication
cell. Table 3 gives a list of (Q × Σ)-transitions that induces V ’s strategy δ. It is clear from the list that
δ is well-formed because of the reversibility of δM and that the publicness condition for V is met. Finally,
the honest prover P is a prover who does not alter any communication symbol; that is, P applies only the
identity operator at every step.
V|c|q0〉|#〉 = |q〉|q〉 if δM (q0, |c, q) = 1
Vb|p〉|p〉 = |q〉|q〉 if δM (p, b, q) = 1
Vb|p〉|q〉 = |qrej,p,q〉|qrej,p,q〉 if p 6= q and p ∈ Qnon
Table 3: (Q×Γ)-transitions {Vσ}σ∈Σˇ of V for L with b ∈ Σ∪ {$} and p, q ∈ Q. All inner states qrej,p,q are rejecting
states.
On input x ∈ Σ∗, the QIP system (P, V ) accepts x with certainty if x ∈ L, since V exactly simulates
M by the help of the honest prover P . Let us consider the opposite case where x 6∈ L. It is easy to see
that the best strategy for a dishonest prover P ∗ is to keep any communication symbol unchanged because
any alteration of the communication symbols causes V to reject x immediately and lowers the acceptance
probability of V . Against such a prover P ∗, V obviously enables to reject x with certainty because, in this
case, V ’s final decision is not influenced by the communication symbols. Therefore, (P, V ) recognizes L with
certainty. Since L is arbitrary, we obtain the desired containment 1RFA ⊆ QIP1,1(1qfa, public).
Secondly, the separation between 1QFA and QIP1,1(1qfa, public) immediately follows from Lemma 4.2 to-
gether with the fact that Zero is not in 1QFA [1]. Moreover, since 1RFA ⊆ 1QFA and QIP1,1(1qfa, public) *
1QFA, we can conclude that 1RFA 6= QIP(1qfa, public). This completes the proof. ✷
Next, we shall examine public QIP systems whose verifiers are 2qfa’s. Similar to Theorem 3.2(2), we can
claim the following two separations.
Theorem 4.4 1. QIP(2qfa, public, poly-time) * AM(2pfa, poly-time).
2. QIP(2qfa, public, poly-time, c-prover) * AM(2pfa, poly-time).
A language that separates the public QIP systems with 2qfa verifiers from AM(2pfa, poly-time) is
Upal = {0n1n | n ∈ N}. Since Upal resides outside of AM(2pfa, poly-time) [6] and Upal belongs to
2QFA(poly-time) [11], the separation 2QFA(poly-time) * AM(2qfa, poly-time) follows immediately. This
separation, however, does not directly imply Theorem 4.4 because, for a technical reason similar to the case
of 1qfa verifiers, it is not known whether 2QFA(poly-time) is included in QIP(2qfa, public, poly-time) or
even in QIP(2qfa, public, poly-time, c-prover). Therefore, we still need to prove in the next lemma that
Upal indeed belongs to both QIP(2qfa, public, poly-time) and QIP(2qfa, public, poly-time, c-prover).
Lemma 4.5 For any constant ǫ in (0, 1], Upal belongs to the intersection
QIP1,1−ǫ(2qfa, public, poly-time) ∩QIP1,1−ǫ(2qfa, public, poly-time, c-prover).
Proof. In what follows, we shall prove that Upal belongs to QIP1,1−ǫ(2qfa, public, poly-time). The proof
for Upal ∈ QIP1,1−ǫ(2qfa, public, poly-time, c-prover) is similar. Let N = ⌈1/ǫ⌉. Let us define our public
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QIP system (P, V ). The honest prover P always applies the identity operation at every step. The verifier
V acts as follows. In the first phase, it determines whether an input x is of the form 0m1n. The rest of
the verifier’s algorithm is similar in essence to the one given in the proof of Lemma 3.3. In the second
phase, V generates N parallel branches with equal amplitude 1/
√
N by entering N different inner states,
say, r1, r2, . . . , rN . In the third phase, along the jth branch starting with rj (j ∈ [1, N ]Z), the tape head
idles for N − j steps at each tape cell containing 0 and idles for j steps at each cell containing 1 until the
tape head finishes reading 1s. In the fourth phase, V applies the QFT to collapse all computation paths to
a single accepting inner state if m = n. Otherwise, all the computation paths do not interfere with each
other since the tape head reaches $ at different times along different computation paths. During the first
and second phases, V publicly reveals the information (q′, d′) on his next move and then checks whether
the prover rewrites it with a different symbol. To constrain the prover’s strategy, V immediately enters a
rejecting inner state if the prover alters the content of the communication cell.
An analysis of the QIP protocol (P, V ) for its completeness and soundness conditions is essentially the
same as in the proof of Lemma 3.3. In conclusion, Upal is in QIP1,1−ǫ(2qfa, public, poly-time), as requested.
✷
5 How Many Interactions are Necessary or Sufficient?
In the previous two sections, despite heavy restrictions on QIP systems, we have witnessed that quantum
interactions between a prover and a qfa verifier remarkably enhance the qfa’s ability to recognize certain
types of languages. Since our basic QIP model forces a verifier to communicate with a prover at every
move, it is natural to ask whether such interactions are truly necessary. To answer this question, we shall
remodel QIP systems so that verifiers are allowed to communicate with provers only at the time when the
verifiers need any help from the provers. Throughout this section, we shall shed new light on the number of
interactions between a prover and a verifier in those new QIP systems, and we shall carefully examine how
many interactions are necessary or sufficient to conduct a given task of language recognition.
5.1 Interaction-Bounded QIP Systems
To study the number of interactions between a prover and a verifier, we want to modify our basic QIP
systems so that a prover is permitted to alter a communication symbol in the communication cell exactly
when the verifier asks the prover to do so. To make such a modification, we first look into the IP systems
of Dwork and Stockmeyer [6]. In their system, a verifier is allowed to do computation “silently” at any
chosen time with no communication with a prover; in other words, the verifier interacts with the prover
only when the help of the prover is needed and the prover patiently awaits for next interactions without
conducting any computation. We interpret the verifier’s silent mode as follows: if the verifier V does not
wish to communicate with the prover, he writes a special communication symbol in the communication cell
to signal the prover that he needs no help from the prover. Simply, we use the blank symbol # to condition
that the prover is prohibited to tailor the content of the communication cell.
We formally introduce a new QIP system, in which no malicious prover P is permitted to cheat a verifier
by willfully tampering with the symbol # in the communication cell. Since the verifier is governed by
quantum mechanics, if a malicious prover willfully modifies #, the verifier’s computation may be significantly
hampered and the verifier may have no means to prevent such an action of the prover because of the
unitarity requirement of the verifier’s strategy δ. To describe a “valid and legitimate” prover P independent
of the choice of verifiers, we require the prover’s strategy Px = {UxP,i}i∈N+ acting on the prover’s visible
configuration space M⊗P on each input x to do nothing (namely, apply the identity operator). To allow
a prover P to maintain the unitarity of his strategy UxP,i, we also permit the prover to modify his private
information γ (including a content of the communication cell) when γ never appears in an actual computation
with non-zero amplitudes. To formulate this condition independent of the verifier, we need to introduce a
series {Si}i∈N of elements in ∆∞fin. This series {Si}i∈N is defined recursively as S0 = {#∞} and Si (i ∈ N+)
is the collection of all elements y ∈ ∆∞fin such that, for a certain element z ∈ Si−1 and certain communication
symbols σ, τ ∈ Γ, the superposition UxP,i|σ〉|z〉 contains the visible configuration |τ〉|y〉 of non-zero amplitude,
namely, |〈y|〈τ |UxP,i|σ〉|z〉| > 0. Now, our requested condition is expressed as follows.
(*) For every i ∈ N+ and every y ∈ Si−1, UxP,i|#〉|y〉 = |#〉|y〉.
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Any prover P who satisfies Condition (*) is succinctly referred to as committed.†† A trivial example of a
committed prover is the prover PI , who always applies the identity operator. A committed prover lets the
verifier safely make a number of moves without any “direct” interaction with him. Observe that this new
QIP model with committed provers is in essence closer to a circuit-based QIP model of Watrous [17] than
the original QIP model is. For convenience, we name our new model an interaction-bounded QIP system and
use the new notation QIP#(1qfa) for the class of all languages recognized with bounded error probability by
such interaction-bounded QIP systems with 1qfa verifiers. Note that standard QIP systems can be naturally
transformed into interaction-bounded QIP systems by (possibly) modifying the blank symbol appropriately
to a fresh non-blank symbol. This simple fact implies that QIP#(1qfa) contains QIP(1qfa), which equals
REG [16].
Lemma 5.1 REG ⊆ QIP#(1qfa).
We are now ready to clarify the meaning of the number of interactions in an interaction-bounded QIP
system (P, V ). Let us consider any non-halting global configuration in which V on input x communicates
with a prover (that is, writes a non-blank symbol in the communication cell). For convenience, we call such a
global configuration a query configuration and, at such a query configuration, V is said to query a symbol to
the prover. Recall from Section 2.1 the definition of global computation paths. The number of interactions in
a given computation means the maximum number, over all global computation paths χ of the computation
of (P, V ), of all query configurations of non-zero amplitudes along χ. Let L be any language and assume
that (P, V ) recognizes L. We say that the QIP protocol (P, V ) makes i interactions on input x if i equals the
number of interactions during the computation of (P, V ) on x. Furthermore, we call the QIP system (P, V )
k-interaction bounded‡‡ if (i) for every x ∈ L, the protocol (P, V ) makes at most k interactions on the input x
and (ii) for every x /∈ L and for every committed prover P ∗, the protocol (P ∗, V ) makes at most k interactions
on the input x. At last, let QIP#k (1qfa) denote the class of all languages recognized with bounded error
probability by k-interaction bounded QIP systems with 1qfa verifiers. Since verifiers can control the number
of queries, it is not difficult to show that 1QFA ⊆ QIP#k (1qfa) ⊆ QIP#k+1(1qfa) ⊆ QIP#(1qfa) for any
constant k ∈ N. In particular, QIP#0 (1qfa) = 1QFA holds.
As the main theorem of this section, we want to show in Theorem 5.2 that (i) 1-interaction helps a verifier
but (ii) 1-interaction does not achieve the full power of QIP#(1qfa).
Theorem 5.2 QIP#0 (1qfa) $ QIP
#
1 (1qfa) $ QIP
#(1qfa).
Theorem 5.2 is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.3 and Proposition 5.4, and its proof proceeds as follows.
For the first inequality of the theorem, we shall take the language Odd defined as the set of all binary strings
of the form 0m1z, where m ∈ N, z ∈ {0, 1}∗, and z contains an odd number of 0s. Since Odd 6∈ 1QFA [2], we
shall show in Lemma 5.3 that Odd belongs to QIP#1 (1qfa). For the second inequality of the theorem, recall
the regular language Zero = {x0 | x ∈ {0, 1}∗} from Section 4. We shall demonstrate in Proposition 5.4
that QIP#1 (1qfa) does not include Zero. Since REG ⊆ QIP#(1qfa) by Lemma 5.1, Zero must belong to
QIP#(1qfa), and thus we shall obtain the desired separation of QIP#(1qfa) from QIP#1 (1qfa). It therefore
suffices to prove Lemma 5.3 and Proposition 5.4.
As the first step, we prove Lemma 5.3 that asserts Odd ∈ QIP#1 (1qfa).
Lemma 5.3 Odd ∈ QIP#1 (1qfa).
Proof. We shall design a 1-interaction bounded QIP system (P, V ) that recognizes Odd. Now, let
Σ = {0, 1} and Γ = {#, a} be respectively an input alphabet and a communication alphabet for (P, V ).
Moreover, let Q = {q0, q1, q2, qacc, qrej,0, qrej,1} be a set of V ’s inner states with Qacc = {qacc} and Qrej =
{qrej,0, qrej,1}. The protocol of the verifier V is described as follows. Table 4 gives a formal description of
V ’s (Q,Γ)-transitions. Making no query to a committed prover, V continues to read input symbols until its
tape head scans 1 on the input tape. When V reads 1, he queries the symbol a to a committed prover by
executing the transition V1|q0〉|#〉 = |q0〉|a〉. If the prover returns a, then V immediately rejects the input.
Otherwise, V checks whether the substring of the input after 1 includes an odd number of 0s. This check
††There are a number of possible variants, one of which requires that, for every i ∈ N+ and for every y ∈ ∆∞
fin
, Ux
P,i
|#〉|y〉 =
|#〉|ψx,y,i〉 holds for a certain quantum state |ψx,y,i〉.
‡‡When x ∈ L and P ∗ is a malicious prover, Condition (i) does not impose any restriction on the number of interactions
for (P ∗, V ) on x. Instead of Conditions (i)–(ii), we could take a much stronger condition; for example, for every x and every
committed prover P ∗, (P ∗, V ) makes at most k interactions. Such a stronger condition actually makes simpler the proof of,
say, Proposition 5.4.
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can be done by V alone by applying Vb|q1〉|#〉 and Vb|q2〉|#〉 for b ∈ Σ. The role of the honest prover P
is to work as an eraser, which erases any non-blank symbol written in the communication cell, to help the
verifier safely make a transition from the inner state q0 to q1. Note that, without the eraser, V alone cannot
make such a transition because the unitary requirement of V ’s strategy (namely, two orthonormal vectors
are transformed into two orthonormal ones) prohibits him from transforming both |q1〉|a〉 and |q1〉|#〉 into
|q1〉|#〉. To be more precise, whenever receiving the symbol a from V , P returns the symbol # and copies
a into the first blank cell of his private tape. Technically speaking, to make P unitary, we need to map
other visible configurations |#〉|y〉 for certain y’s not having appeared in P ’s private tape to superpositions
of the form |a〉|φx,y〉 with an appropriate vector |φx,y〉. By right implementation, it is possible to make P a
committed prover.
V|c|q0〉|#〉 = |q0〉|#〉 V0|q0〉|#〉 = |q0〉|#〉 V1|q0〉|#〉 = |q1〉|a〉
V$|q0〉|#〉 = |qrej,0〉|#〉 V0|q1〉|#〉 = |q2〉|#〉 V1|q1〉|#〉 = |q1〉|#〉
V$|q1〉|#〉 = |qrej,1〉|#〉 V0|q2〉|#〉 = |q1〉|#〉 V1|q2〉|#〉 = |q2〉|#〉
V$|q2〉|#〉 = |qacc〉|#〉 V0|q1〉|a〉 = |qrej,0〉|#〉 V1|q1〉|a〉 = |qrej,0〉|#〉
Table 4: (Q× Γ)-transitions {Vσ}σ∈Σˇ of V for Odd
Next, we shall show that (P, V ) recognizes Odd with probability 1. Let x be any binary input. First,
consider the case where x is in Odd. Assume that x is of the form 0m1y, where y contains an odd number
of 0s. The honest prover P erases a that is sent from V when V reads 1. This process helps V shift to the
next mode of checking the number of 0s. Since V can check whether y includes an odd number of 0s without
any communication with the prover, V eventually accepts x with certainty. On the contrary, assume that
x 6∈ Odd. In the special case where x ∈ {0}∗, V can reject x with certainty with no query to a committed
prover. Now, focus our attention to the remaining case where x contains a 1. Let us assume that x is of the
form 0m1y, where y contains an even number of 0s. The verifier V sends a to a committed prover when he
reads 1. Note that V ’s protocol is essentially deterministic. To maximize the acceptance probability of V , a
malicious prover needs to return # to V since, otherwise, V immediately rejects x in a deterministic fashion.
Since V can check whether y includes an odd number of 0s without making any query to the prover, for any
committed prover P ∗, the QIP protocol (P ∗, V ) rejects x with certainty. Since the number of interactions
made by the protocol is obviously at most 1, Odd therefore belongs to QIP#1 (1qfa), as requested. ✷
As the second step, we need to prove Proposition 5.4 regarding the language Zero = {x0 | x ∈ {0, 1}∗}.
This regular language Zero is known to be outside of 1QFA [11]; in other words, Zero 6∈ QIP#0 (1qfa) since
QIP#0 (1qfa) = 1QFA. Proposition 5.4 expands this impossibility result and shows that Zero is not even in
QIP#1 (1qfa).
Proposition 5.4 Zero 6∈ QIP#1 (1qfa).
Since the proof of Proposition 5.4 is quite involved, it will be given in the subsequent subsection.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 5.4
Our proof of Proposition 5.4 proceeds by way of contradiction. Towards a contradiction, we start with
assuming Zero ∈ QIP#1 (1qfa) and take a 1-interaction bounded QIP system (P, V ) with 1qfa verifier V that
recognizes Zero with error probability at most 1/2 − η for a certain constant η > 0. Our goal is to pick a
suitable string y˜0 and an appropriate prover P ′y and to prove that their associated protocol (P
′
y , V ) accepts
y˜01m with probability at least 1/2, because this contradicts our assumption that Zero ∈ QIP#1 (1qfa). For
this purpose, we shall employ a technical tool, called “query weight”, which is the sum of all the squared
magnitudes of query configurations appearing in a computation of the protocol (P ′, V ) on a specified input.
However, a different choice of provers may result in different query weights, as seen in the second and the
third computation trees shown in Figure 2. To cope with this unfavorable situation, we shall introduce
another computation model, which is not dependent on the choice of provers, and we shall prove that this
model gives an upper-bound of the query weight induced by any committed prover. Using this model and
its query weight, we shall finally select the desired string y˜0 and the desired prover P ′y.
Now, let Q be a set of V ’s inner states and let Γ be a communication alphabet. Write Σ for our input
alphabet {0, 1}. For technicality, we assume without loss of generality that V never queries at the very time
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Figure 2: Examples of a modified computation. The leftmost graph depicts a modified computation of V on input
x. Two remaining graphs are original computations generated by V on x using different provers P1 and P2. The
black circles indicate query configurations whereas the white circles indicate non-query configurations. Let query
configuration ξ marked black have zero amplitude. The crossed grey circle (located at the upper-left side of ξ) is the
place where prover P2 forces V to generate a new computation path that destructively interferes with an existing
path in the modified computation of V .
when it enters a certain halting inner state, that is, the time when V ’s tape head scans $.
First, we introduce two useful notions: “1-interaction condition” and “query weight.” Fix an input
x ∈ Σ∗ and let P ′ be any committed prover. For readability, we use the notation CompV (P ′, x) to denote a
computation of the QIP protocol (P ′, V ) on input x when P ′ takes strategy P ′x.
A committed prover P ′ is said to meet the 1-interaction condition at x with V if the corresponding
protocol (P ′, V ) makes at most 1 interaction on input x. Note that, when P ′ satisfies the 1-interaction
condition at x with V , for any query configuration ξ of non-zero amplitude along computation path χ in
CompV (P
′, x), there exists no other query configuration in CompV (P ′, x) between the initial configuration
and this given configuration ξ along the computation path χ. Let C
(1)
x,V be the collection of all committed
provers P ′ who satisfy the 1-interaction condition at x with V . It is important to note that, whenever
a prover in C
(1)
x,V answers to V with non-blank communication symbols with non-zero amplitude, V must
change these symbols back to the blank symbol immediately since, otherwise, V is considered to make the
second query in the next round, according to the definition of our interaction-bounded QIP model.
Now, let us choose any prover P ′ in C(1)x,V and consider its computation CompV (P
′, x). By introducing
an extra projection operator, we modify CompV (P
′, x) as follows. Whenever V performs a projective
measurement onto (Wnon,Wacc,Wrej), we then apply to the communication cell an additional projection
that maps onto the Hilbert space spanned by |#〉. This projection makes all non-blank symbols collapse.
The protocol (P, V ) then continues to the next step. By Condition (*) in Section 5.1, observe that the
computation obtained by inserting an extra projection operator at every step of V is independent of the
choice of committed provers. To express this modified computation of V on x, we use another notation
MCompV (x). Figure 2 illustrates the difference between such a modified computation and two original
computations generated by two different provers P1 and P2.
For two strings x, y ∈ Σ∗, the query weight wt(x)V (y) of V at y conditional to x is the sum of all the squared
magnitudes of the amplitudes of query configurations appearing in MCompV (xy) while V is reading y. For
brevity, let wtV (y) = wt
(λ)
V (y), where λ is the empty string. Note that this query weight wt
(x)
V (y) ranges
between 0 and 1 and satisfies that wtV (x) + wt
(x)
V (y) = wtV (xy) for any strings x, y ∈ Σ∗.
Recall from our assumption that (P, V ) is a 1-interaction bounded QIP system recognizing Zero with
success probability at least 1/2 + η. The following lemma shows two properties of the query weights of V .
Lemma 5.5 Let P ′ be any committed prover and let x, y be any strings.
1. If P ′ ∈ C(1)x,V , then, for every query configuration ξ of non-zero amplitude in CompV (P ′, x), any
computation path χ in CompV (P
′, x) ending with ξ appears in MCompV (x) ending with ξ of the same
amplitude.
2. If P ′ ∈ C(1)xy,V , then wt(x)V (y) is greater than or equal to the sum of all the squared magnitudes of
amplitudes of query configurations in CompV (P
′, xy) while V ’s tape head is reading y.
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Proof. (1) Take any committed prover P ′ in C(1)x,V . Let ξ be any query configuration in CompV (P
′, x)
having non-zero amplitude, say, αξ. Since αξ is not zero in CompV (P
′, x), there must exist at least one
computation path in CompV (P
′, x) ending with ξ of non-zero amplitude. Let us consider such a computation
path, say, χ. Since P ′ satisfies the 1-interaction condition, χ cannot contain any query configuration of
non-zero amplitude except for the last configuration ξ. By the definition of MCompV (x), no projective
measurement on the communication cell is performed along χ. Hence, all configurations inside χ must be
present also in MCompV (x). Thus, χ appears in MCompV (x). Since χ is arbitrary, all the computation
paths in CompV (P
′, x) ending with ξ, which contribute to the amplitude αξ, must appear in MCompV (x).
Therefore, the amplitude of ξ in MCompV (x) equals αξ, as requested.
(2) Assume that P ′ ∈ C(1)xy,V . Let us recall that the query weight wt(x)V (y) is the sum of all the squared
magnitudes of the amplitudes of query configurations inMCompV (xy) while V ’s reading y. By (1), for every
query configuration ξ of non-zero amplitude in CompV (P
′, xy), the squared magnitude of the amplitude of
ξ in CompV (P
′, xy) is equal to that of ξ in MCompV (xy). Note that the converse in general may not be
true; that is, there may be a query configuration of non-zero amplitude in MCompV (x) that never appears
in CompV (P
′, x). Figure 2 illustrates such a case. By summing up the squared magnitudes over all query
configurations ξ in CompV (P
′, xy), we immediately obtain (2). ✷
We continue the proof of Proposition 5.4. Let us consider a value ν that is the supremum, over all strings
w in Zero, of the query weight of V at w; namely, ν = supw∈Zero{wtV (w)}. Observe that 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1 since
any query weight is in the unit real interval [0, 1]. For readability, we omit the letter V whenever it is clear
from the context. Let PI denote a committed prover applying only the identity operator at every step.
Claim 1 ν > 0.
Proof. Let us assume that ν = 0. From this assumption, it follows that wt(x) = 0 for all x ∈ Zero.
To obtain a contradiction, we aim at constructing an appropriate bounded-error 1qfa M that recognizes
Zero. Recall that P is a honest committed prover that makes the 1-interaction bounded QIP system (P, V )
recognize Zero. Firstly, we assert that even a simple protocol (PI , V ) can recognize Zero with success
probability at least 1/2+ η. For each input x ∈ Zero, since wt(x) = 0, Lemma 5.5(2) implies that all query
configurations in CompV (P, x) must have zero amplitudes. This situation implies that, in the superposition
of global configurations at each step of the computation of (P, V ) on x, the verifier V ’s next moves cannot
be affected by any messages sent out by P . Hence, we can replace P by PI without changing the outcome
of V .
Next, we shall construct the desired 1qfa M . Any inner state of M has the form (q, σ), which implicitly
reflects both V ’s inner state q and a symbol σ in the communication cell. Our 1qfa M behaves as follows.
On input x, M simulates V on x using the “imaginary” prover PI by maintaining the content of the
communication cell as an integrated part of M ’s inner states.
Finally, we claim that M recognizes Zero with bounded error probability. Let x be any input string. If
x is in Zero, then, since any query configuration with the prover PI has the zero amplitude, M correctly
accepts x with probability ≥ 1/2 + η. Likewise, if x is not in Zero, then the protocol (PI , V ) rejects x with
probability ≥ 1/2+ η; thus, M also rejects x with the same probability. Therefore, M recognizes Zero with
error probability at most 1/2−η, as requested. Since Zero /∈ 1QFA, we obtain a contradiction, and therefore
ν > 0 follows. ✷
Next, we shall construct a committed prover P ′ and a string z /∈ Zero that force the protocol (P ′, V )
to accept z with probability at least 1/2. Let us recall from Section 2.1 the notation Pw, which refers to
a strategy {UwP,i}i∈N+ of P on input w. Since ν > 0 by Claim 1, for every real number γ ∈ (0, ν], there
exists a string w in Zero such that wt(w) ≥ ν − γ. Given any y ∈ Σ∗, we set γy = min{η2/16(|y|+ 1)2, ν}
and choose the lexicographically minimal string wy ∈ Zero satisfying wt(wy) ≥ ν − γy. For readability, we
abbreviate the string wyy as y˜.
Moreover, we define a new committed prover P ′y that behaves on input y˜01
m (= wyy01
m), where m ∈ N,
in the following fashion: P ′y follows the strategy Py˜0 while V ’s tape head is reading |cwy and then P ′y behaves
as PI while V is reading the remaining portion y01
m$. Since P satisfies the 1-iteration condition, we obtain
Py˜0 ∈ C(1)y˜0,V . By its definition, P ′y also belongs to C(1)y˜0,V . As for the notation pacc(x, P, V ) introduced in
Section 2.1, we simply drop “V ” and write pacc(x, P ) instead. We then claim the following lower bound of
pacc(y˜0, P
′
y).
Claim 2 For any string y ∈ Σ∗, pacc(y˜0, P ′y) ≥ 1/2 + η/2.
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Proof. Let y be an arbitrary input string. From the fact y˜0 ∈ Zero, it must hold that pacc(y˜0, Py˜0) ≥
1/2 + η because (P, V ) recognizes Zero. Note that, on the same input y˜0, the protocol (P ′y, V ) works in
the same way as (Py˜0, V ) while V is reading |cwy . Consider the query weight wt(y˜0). Since wt(y˜0) ≤ ν, we
obtain wt(wy) + wt
(wy)(y0) = wt(y˜0) ≤ ν, from which it follows that wt(wy)(y0) ≤ γy using the inequality
wt(wy) ≥ ν − γy. Lemma 5.5(2) implies that, for any committed prover P ∗ in C(1)y˜0,V , wt(wy)(y0) upper-
bounds the sum of all the squared magnitudes of the amplitudes of query configurations in CompV (P
∗, y˜0)
while the tape head is reading y0$. Notice that both Py˜0 and P
′
y belong to C
(1)
y˜0,V . Taking Py˜0 and P
′
y as
P ∗, a simple calculation shows that
∣∣pacc(y˜0, P ′y)− pacc(y˜0, Py˜0)∣∣ ≤ 2(wt(wy)(y0))1/2 |y0| ≤ 2√γy(|y|+ 1)
≤ 2
√
η2
16(|y|+ 1)2 · (|y|+ 1) = η/2,
where the first inequality is shown as in, e.g., [18, Lemma 9]. Since pacc(y˜0, Py˜0) ≥ 1/2 + η, it follows that
pacc(y˜0, P
′
y) ≥ pacc(y˜0, Py˜0)− η/2 ≥ (1/2 + η)− η/2 ≥ 1/2 + η/2. ✷
Henceforth, we shall turn our attention to the protocol (P ′y, V ) working on input y˜01
m for any number
m ∈ N+ and we shall estimate its acceptance probability pacc(y˜01m, P ′y).
The initial superposition of global configurations is |q0〉|#〉|#∞〉, where we omit the qubits representing
the tape head position of V , because the tape head moves only in one direction without stopping. Let
V = span{|q〉 | q ∈ Q}, let M = span{|σ〉 | σ ∈ Γ}, and let P be a Hilbert space representing the prover’s
private tape. For each number m ∈ N+, we denote by |ψy,m〉 a superposition in the global configuration
space V ⊗M⊗P obtained by (P ′y , V ) on input y˜01m just after V ’s tape head moves off the right end of |cy˜0
and P ′y then applies the identity operator while reading the remaining 1
m$. Since P ′y basically does nothing
after V has read |cwy , |ψy,m〉 does not depend on the choice of m. We therefore write |ψy〉 instead of |ψy,m〉,
for simplicity. Moreover, we set µ = infy∈Σ∗{‖|ψy〉‖}.
Claim 3 µ > 0.
Proof. Let us prove this claim by contradiction. First, assume that µ = 0. Since this assumption
means infy∈Σ∗{‖|ψy〉‖2} = 0 and the constant η is positive by its definition, there exists a string y ∈ Σ∗
satisfying ‖|ψy〉‖2 < η. Now, let us consider a special input string y˜01. Since y˜01 6∈ Zero, it must follow that
pacc(y˜01, P
′
y) ≤ 1/2− η by the soundness condition of the 1-interaction bounded QIP system (P, V ). Notice
that |ψy〉 is composed only of non-halting configurations having non-zero amplitudes. For convenience, let
αy denote the total acceptance probability of V obtained while V ’s reading y˜0 (not including $). It holds
that pacc(y˜0, P
′
y) ≤ αy + ‖|ψy〉‖2. While V is reading y˜0 out of y˜01, P ′y takes exactly the same strategy as P
does on the input y˜0. We thus conclude that pacc(y˜01, P
′
y) is at least αy. By combining those inequalities,
we obtain pacc(y˜0, P
′
y) ≤ pacc(y˜01, P ′y) + ‖|ψy〉‖2. Since pacc(y˜0, P ′y) ≥ 1/2 + η/2 by Claim 2, it follows that
‖|ψy〉‖2 ≥ pacc(y˜0, P ′y)− pacc(y˜01, P ′y) ≥ 1/2 + η/2− (1/2− η) > η, a contradiction. Therefore, µ > 0 must
hold. ✷
Let ǫ be any sufficiently small positive real number and choose the lexicographically first string y for
which ‖|ψy〉‖ ∈ [µ, µ+ ǫ). Let I1 and I2 denote the identity operators acting on P and V , respectively, and
write W for (I2 ⊗ PI)(Enon ⊗ I1)(V1 ⊗ I1), where Vσ is a (Q × Γ)-transition of V on symbol σ. For any
integer j ≥ 1, it holds that µ ≤ ‖W j |ψy〉‖ < µ + ǫ by the definition of µ. Note that, since y is fixed, the
prover P ′y uses only a finite number of tape cells on his private tape. Let d denote the maximal number of
cells in use by P ′y. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the Hilbert space P is of dimension d.
Thus, all vectors in a series {W j|ψy〉 | j ∈ N+} are in a Hilbert space of dimension d|Σ||Γ|. Since µ > 0 by
Claim 3, there are two numbers j1, j2 ∈ N with ji < j2 such that ‖W j1 |ψy〉 −W j2 |ψy〉‖ < ǫ. By an analysis
similar to [11] (see also [8, Lemma 4.1.10]), there exist a constant c > 0, which is independent of the value
of ǫ, satisfying that ‖W j1 |ψy〉 −W j2 |ψy〉‖ ≤ ‖|ψy〉 −Wm|ψy〉‖ < c · ǫ1/4, where m = j2 − j1 ≥ 1. From this
inequality follows∣∣pacc(y˜0, P ′y)− pacc(y˜01m, P ′y)∣∣ ≤ ‖V$|ψy〉 − V$Wm|ψy〉‖ = ‖|ψy〉 −Wm|ψy〉‖ < cǫ1/4,
where the first inequality is a folklore (see [18, Lemma 8] for its proof). Since ǫ is arbitrary, we can set
ǫ = (η/2c)
4
. Because pacc(y˜0, P
′
y) ≥ 1/2 + η/2 by Claim 2, it follows that pacc(y˜01m, P ′y) ≥ (1/2 + η/2) −
cǫ1/4 = 1/2. This contradicts our assumption that, for any committed prover P ∗, (P ∗, V ) accepts y˜01m with
probability ≤ 1/2− η/2 < 1/2. Therefore, Zero does not belong to QIP#1 (1qfa), as requested.
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We have finally completed the proof of Proposition 5.4.
6 Challenging Open Questions
Throughout Sections 3–5, we have placed various restrictions on the behaviors of verifiers and provers in our
qfa-verifier QIP systems and we have studied how those restrictions affect the language recognition power of
the systems. The restricted models that we have considered in Sections 3–5 include: classical-prover QIPs,
public QIPs, and interaction-bounded QIPs. After an initial study of this paper, nonetheless, there still
remain numerous unsolved questions concerning those QIP systems. Hereafter, we shall give a short list of
the important open questions as a helping guide to future research.
(1) The relationships between quantum provers and classical provers are still not entirely clear in the
context of qfa-verifier QIP systems, mostly because of the soundness condition imposed on the systems. For
example, we expect to see a fundamental separation between QIP(1qfa) and QIP(1qfa, c-prover) as well as
between QIP(2qfa, poly-time) and QIP(2qfa, poly-time, c-prover).
(2) In general, we need to discover precise relationships between public-coin IP systems (namely, AM sys-
tems) and public QIP systems beyond Theorem 4.4. Moreover, associated with 2qfa verifiers, we ask whether
2QFA(poly-time) is properly included in QIP(2qfa, public) and whether QIP(2qfa, public, poly-time) is dif-
ferent from QIP(2qfa, poly-time). A separation between QIP(2qfa) and QIP(2qfa, public) is also unknown
and this must be settled.
(3) A new interaction-bounded QIP system is of special interest in analyzing the roles of interactions
between provers and verifiers. For this model, we hope to see that the equality QIP#(1qfa) = QIP(1qfa)
indeed holds. Unsolved so far is a general question of whether k + 1 interactions are more powerful than
k interactions. Since a 1qfa verifier is unable to count the number of interactions (or queries), we may not
directly generalize the proof of Theorem 5.2 to assert that QIP#k (1qfa) 6= QIP#k+1(1qfa) for any constant k
in N+. Nevertheless, we still conjecture that this assertion is true.
(4) It is of great interest to seek an algebraic characterization of our qfa-verifier QIP systems. Such a
characterization may shed new light on a nature of quantum interactions between two parties.
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